What is the experience of going to the museum to find treasures on the spot? Let collectors tell you what "a few treasures" are.

In order to further enrich the resources such as exhibitions, lectures and social cultural relics appraisal of Pudong History Museum, recently, Pudong History Museum and Shanghai Collection Association held a series of activities of co-construction and co-education in the museum.

More than 100 guests, including relevant personnel from Shanghai Collection Association, Pudong New Area Cultural Relics Protection Management Office, Pudong History Museum and cultural enthusiasts, participated in the day’s activities. On that day, the folk treasure-hunting activities were the most popular, and the organizers specially invited Zhu Li, former general manager of Shanghai Cultural Relics Store, distinguished professor Shen Asia, researcher of Shanghai Museum and ancient conservatory of Fudan University. They are all famous experts in antique art appraisal. Many collectors at the scene heard the news and came out with their own collections for experts to appreciate.

Most of the objects brought by collectors are ancestral objects, including porcelain, calligraphy and painting, ancient coins and many other categories. Through the professional guidance and appraisal of experts, everyone has a new understanding of their "baby". Many participants said that it is still meaningful to invite experts to treasure in the museum, hoping that Pudong History Museum can provide more opportunities for appreciation and exchange for folk collectors.

The price reduction news of Mercedes-Benz EQE SUV in Xuzhou area, the latest offer is 341,000! If you miss it, you won’t

[car home Xuzhou Preferential Promotion Channel] is currently carrying out preferential promotion activities in Xuzhou, with the highest discount of 145,000 yuan and the lowest starting price of only 341,000 yuan. If you are interested in this model, please click "Check the car price" in the quotation form to get a higher discount.

徐州地区奔驰EQE

Mercedes-Benz EQE SUV brings people visual impact with its unique front face design and striking body lines. Its front face adopts a closed air intake grille with sharp LED headlights, creating a strong sense of science and technology. The body lines are smooth, and the overall style is fashionable and dynamic, which highlights the luxury and exquisiteness of Mercedes-Benz.

徐州地区奔驰EQE

Mercedes-Benz EQE SUV has a body size of 4880*2032*1679 mm and a wheelbase of 3030 mm, providing a spacious and comfortable interior space. The side lines of the car body are smooth, elegant and dynamic. The front tread is 1649 mm and the rear tread is 1662 mm, which ensures excellent handling stability. Equipped with 19-inch wheels and 235/55 R19 tires, it shows the perfect combination of luxury and sports.

徐州地区奔驰EQE

The interior design of Mercedes-Benz EQE SUV follows Mercedes-Benz’s consistent luxury style. The center console is equipped with a 12.8-inch high-resolution central control screen, providing drivers with an intuitive and easy-to-use operation interface. The steering wheel is made of leather, with delicate touch and electric up-down and forward-backward adjustment function, which provides a comfortable grip experience for drivers of different heights. Both the front seat and the co-pilot seat are equipped with heating and ventilation functions, and support electric adjustment, height adjustment, backrest adjustment, leg rest adjustment and lumbar support, which improves the riding comfort. The main and co-pilot seats also have seat memory function, which is convenient for drivers to quickly adjust to personalized settings. The car is equipped with USB and Type-C interfaces. There are 3 interfaces in the front row and 2 interfaces in the back row to meet the diverse charging needs of passengers. In addition, the front seats are also equipped with mobile phone wireless charging function, allowing drivers to enjoy a convenient charging experience on the road.

徐州地区奔驰EQE

Mercedes-Benz EQE SUV is equipped with an excellent motor with a maximum power of 300 kW and a maximum torque of 858 Nm, which provides drivers with strong power output and excellent acceleration performance.

The owner of car home said that although the power performance of Mercedes-Benz EQE SUV is good, it is not equipped with rear wheel steering function in the low-profile model, which makes the vehicle inflexible. As the owner of the BMW 3 Series, he feels that there is still a certain gap in the handling of this SUV, especially when passing through the pit, the body will shake more, and the overall feeling is softer.

"Long Live" premiered in Ke Jie: After playing chess with AI, life is wonderful.

1905 movie network news On the evening of November 26th, the movie Long Live was premiered in Beijing. Directors Cheng Gong, Ren Changzhen and the producers of the film appeared one by one. Go player Ke Jie also attended the premiere as a special guest to watch this documentary film. Although the host never let go of the feeling of chatting with Ke Jie and playing chess with artificial intelligence, Ke Jie returned to the movie, saying that after playing chess with artificial intelligence, he felt that life was not easy and long live life.

 

Long live life records the living conditions of more than ten ordinary Chinese in 2017. Among these people, there are female taxi drivers, street singers and couples, and uncles who pedal three rounds in Lhasa. These people who have no intersection constitute the hardships and helplessness that the film wants to tell, but everyone is silently insisting on life.

 

When talking about why he invested in such a film, producer Guo Binggang said: "As a practitioner in the industry, a director once said that in our industry, people are doing it and the sky is watching. The industry is progressing, and practitioners should provide the audience with nutritious works. Long live life is one of them. This film is kind and warm. I believe this film will go well in the future. This film can make some contributions to the industry. "

 

The two directors have worked closely together before, and the title of "Long Live" comes from a TV documentary that they collaborated on 10 years ago. Ren Changzhen, one of the directors, said that this cooperation was planted 10 years ago. She recalled that she was still a TV director who filmed celebrities instead of ordinary people, while Cheng Gong was an advertising director.

 

Recalling the filming process, Cheng Gong said that it was very easy: "It is easy to make a film. It’s very simple for us. It took three months. After 45 days. This movie is over. Very easy. " But to his surprise, the film was well received during roadshows in more than 20 cities.

 

Go player Ke Jie, as a special guest, also took the stage to talk about his feelings. Although he was also "digging a hole" by the host and talked about his experience of playing chess with artificial intelligence, Ke Jie still smiled and said that after playing with AI, he knew that life was not easy, and then said: "After playing chess with AI, I will feel that life is very beautiful, long live life."

 

The movie Long Live will be officially released on November 27th.


Values, Rice Flour and Ecological Chain: Xiaomi’s Market Power Game (Ⅱ)

       Core tip:

1. Xiaomi, which has not cooperated with any traditional mobile phone brand, has achieved the fastest growth, and the ecological chain strategy is the main reason, which is a unique solution for Xiaomi to expand the market power boundary.

2. Xiaomi’s ecological chain is an active strategy. It takes capital and values as a link, binds a large number of hardware suppliers and entrepreneurs, achieves scale effect, and enhances user stickiness, which is essentially different from the so-called ecological strategy of promoting "ecologicalization".

3. Xiaomi makes its controllable organizational boundary always coincide with the market boundary through the ecological chain, thus effectively achieving the purpose of eliminating competition, improving penetration and preventing entry, which is a very clever market power strategy.

 

Case Provision | Case Center of Entrepreneurial Dark Horse College

Author | Nine Records

 

04

Ecological chain:

The Resource Boundary of Xiaomi Market Power


In fact, among Internet people, Lei Jun is neither the first one to make a mobile phone, nor the last one, nor even the most famous or determined one.

In September 2015, 360 CEO Zhou Hongyi posted a message in a circle of friends, "… … I’ll fuck anyone who stops me from making a mobile phone … …” His remarks were aimed at his partner Coolpad. In December 2014, Qihoo 360 reached a strategic alliance with Coolpad to set up a joint venture company. Coolpad provided smart phone design, research and development, technology, manufacturing, supply chain management, quality control, marketing, after-sales service and other resources, and 360 provided security software, mobile application design and online marketing and promotion resources. But then Coolpad announced the cooperation and shareholding of LeTV, which triggered Zhou Hongyi’s warning.

According to media reports, as early as before the rise of Xiaomi, Zhou Hongyi had talked about cooperation with Huawei with the model of "selling mobile phones at low prices to gain users and Internet advertising distribution to gain benefits", but the cooperation failed. There is also Netease Ding Lei, who found his own shareholder Duan Yongping. As the founder of BBK, Duan Yongping also has a considerable say in vivo and OPPO, and then he didn’t talk it over.

There are several similar examples. In terms of "Internet thinking" and the number of users, Ding Lei and Zhou Hongyi may not be weaker than Lei Jun, but they would rather choose the form of cooperation with mobile phone brand manufacturers, because they know that the traditional ecological model of upstream suppliers and downstream agents is naturally beneficial to enterprises that have been in the industry for a long time. This "market barriers" is hard to break, so it is better to cooperate.

However, today, we can see that Xiaomi, which has not cooperated with any traditional mobile phone brand, is the fastest growing "Internet mobile phone". The difference in strategy is the main reason for the difference in results.Xiaomi adopts a power strategy based on value creation rather than a competitive strategy, which is the ecological chain strategy.

1. Converting capital into resources

To understand Xiaomi’s ecological chain strategy, we must first understand Xiaomi’s position in the market.

Even though a certain power base has been formed in the market through the export of values and fan base, Xiaomi is still at a natural disadvantage in key dependence and trading partnership.

One of the most realistic problems is the competition for upstream resources. Mobile phone hardware industry,There is an extremely complex supply chain system, and each mobile phone company often has hundreds of suppliers.Both start-ups, medium-sized enterprises and large enterprises are facing the challenge of supply chain, and some spare parts even need to be reserved one year in advance. Even with Apple’s power position, every generation of apples may have difficulties in supply in the first two months, and all "hunger marketing" is helpless.

In 2013, Xiaomi once launched a 10400mAh mobile power supply from 69 yuan, but it was out of stock for a long time, and the problem was in the industrial chain. According to media reports at that time, some small and medium-sized brand customers complained that Samsung shelved its plan to supply millet batteries at low prices. Since then, Xiaomi Note2 has also been postponed because it can’t get the most tight AMOLED screen. It is understood that after the decline of Xiaomi’s growth rate in 2015, due to the upstream supply chain manufacturers’ adjustment of the supply plan for Xiaomi to prevent risks, Xiaomi suffered a four-month shortage, indicating that Xiaomi in the supply chain still lacked strong power endorsement.

Another problem lies in the downstream user service link. As an Internet company, Xiaomi’s purpose is not only to sell mobile phones, but to retain users and maintain relationships with users through new retail channels to form long-term services. But if there are no more hardware products besides mobile phones, this business model is not established. Because buying a mobile phone is a very low-frequency behavior, there must be a higher-frequency transaction interaction between Internet companies and their users. In cmnet, software is generally downloaded free of charge, so we must rely on hardware to solve this dilemma.

An obvious problem is that more people are needed to make more kinds of products, but Xiaomi’s pursuit of concentration means keeping the company as small as possible and not doing too many things. If hundreds of hardware products are made, the management pressure and communication pressure are unimaginable.

Like other manufacturers, Xiaomi can also choose to cooperate, but cooperation will lead to the concession of Xiaomi’s product values, with the increase of intermediary agents and circulation links. Many cross-border Internet entrepreneurs have lost their power and lost themselves in cooperation.

Through the establishment of cognitive and relational boundaries, Xiaomi has been invincible in how to sell mobile phones, but it still needs to gather more strength to break the constraints of resources and become the master of the market.

Every entrepreneur has his own unique gift. Lei Jun’s gift is not only his enthusiasm for the Internet, but also his capital operation. He knows what capital wants, and he also has a letter of trust for capital. After 2013 and 2014, with the rise of "Double Innovation", thousands of new intelligent hardware entrepreneurs appeared in China, and they showed Lei Jun a new solution.

As a result, Xiaomi began to use capital to solve the problem. From 2013 to 2014, Xiaomi invested in 25 startups a year.

Xiaomi has two teams to face the cooperation of the ecological circle. One is the ecological circle fund within Xiaomi, which is led by co-founder Liu De. The second is Lei Jun’s Shunwei Fund. In addition, in June 2016, Xiaomi announced that the private bank "Sichuan Hope Bank" jointly sponsored by New Hope Group and other enterprises was officially approved by the China Banking Regulatory Commission. On September 1st, Xiaomi and China UnionPay officially released Xiaomi Pay. In May 2017, it reached a fund cooperation of 12 billion yuan with Changjiang Fund.

Different from the natural ecosystem around big companies, Xiaomi’s ecological chain is a market strategy. The traditional industry ecological chain is that manufacturing enterprises integrate upstream and downstream by means of procurement and distribution. The ecological chain of Xiaomi is to gather a group of startup companies through capital means to realize "group purchase" in the upstream and enrich the products of Xiaomi’s new retail channels in the downstream.

In November 2014, Xiaomi made a round of financing for air purifiers before the air purifier products were listed, with a valuation of 25 million US dollars. If in the traditional supply chain mode, Xiaomi can only get market power equivalent to his actual investment (millions of RMB); However, under the eco-chain model, the power resources obtained by this product are equivalent to those of a company with a valuation of $25 million. In this way, Xiaomi changed the expected capital investment into realistic resources.

This is an original new gameplay that binds products, capital and users together. It is precisely because of this innovation that Xiaomi has used thousands of people to do things that tens of thousands of people can do, and firmly held his own values and did not compromise with the old tradition.

In the animal world, small and weak animals always have to erect their feathers and expand their bodies in the face of a large number of hostile opponents, so as to scare off their opponents. The same is true for start-ups. If they shrink in a corner and are timid, they will definitely become the dish of their opponents.

The ecological chain is another key link in the construction of Xiaomi’s market power. Through the ecological chain, Xiaomi forms alliances with some start-ups by means of capital, and at the same time makes them no longer competitors.

If Apple’s success benefits from a complete ecological chain circled by its own IOS system, then Xiaomi’s ecological chain is an active strategy. It takes capital and values as a link to bind a large number of hardware suppliers and entrepreneurs. On the one hand, it achieves scale effect, on the other hand, it also enhances user stickiness, thus building Xiaomi’s resource-based power boundary.

2. "Xiaomi Ecology" is not "LeTV Ecology"

It is worth noting that Xiaomi’s ecological chain is a market strategy, which is essentially different from the "ecosystem" naturally formed around large enterprises. Xiaomi’s ecological chain is a product of intentional cultivation, not a decentralized network connection, but a core alliance strategy.

The concept of "ecosystem" comes from biology, which was introduced into the field of organizational theory by American sociologists in the 1970s, and formed the school of "organizational ecology". After the rise of the Internet, some scholars put forward the similarity between commercial ecosystem and biological ecosystem, and there are also various relationships among food chain, macro environment and competition. They named such an organizational form that is highly dependent on external cooperation and resource management as "Network Based Organizational Form", which is different from the traditional organizational form that is highly closed or highly dependent on market transactions and has clear boundaries, which is what we now call "ecological model" or ".

Ecology and platform are two concepts that are often confused, although they have many connections. Simply put, the platform strategy is to build a market, while the ecological strategy is to build a city. The core of platform strategy is to link bilateral relations to match transactions, while the core of eco-strategy is to create a closely linked multi-format system by constructing and managing extensive and multi-level cooperative relationships (long-term strategic cooperation agreements, investments, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions and other non-product transactional relationships).

If Xiaomi only buys products from various startups, or only lets enterprises sell products in Xiaomi channel, Xiaomi is the builder of the platform, but Xiaomi is doing "investment+incubation": enterprises in the ecological chain are independent companies. Xiaomi generally holds 20%-25% shares in eco-chain companies, jointly defining products, leading design, assisting in research and development, and endorsing the supply chain. Therefore, the ecological chain of millet has greater diversity and more complex symbiotic relationship.

In the business ecosystem, energy and nutrients mainly appear in the form of user flow. In the process of Alibaba’s development from a platform to an ecosystem, massive users have always been the core and solid foundation of its construction. Similarly, Tencent announced the implementation of the open strategy to build an ecosystem around WeChat, which obviously comes from hundreds of millions of highly sticky users of WeChat.

In addition, in the organizational ecosystem, the value chain assumes the role of food chain. In nature, the food chain is the core organizational logic, which determines the flow and transformation path of energy and nutrients. In Xiaomi ecological chain, the development and release of hidden value of user groups depends on the construction of value chain in the ecosystem.

Therefore,Xiaomi’s ecological chain is actually an extension of its own power boundary. As the core of the ecological chain, Xiaomi should provide a user base that can support the healthy development of the whole ecosystem and control the key links of the value chain/network, which is by no means possible for every enterprise.

In the domestic A-share market, one company once set off the ecological banner, that is LeTV.

Jia Yueting, chairman of LeTV, said: "Our competition with peers can no longer be measured by the gains and losses of a certain stage or point, but more depends on the connection and integration of all links in the ecological chain and the cross-border innovation and continuous subversion on this basis." An open letter to employees.

As a result, LeTV put forward an "eco-anti-"business model, established an all-encompassing ecosystem from sports programs to online car rides, and believed that mutual diversion among eco-enterprises would have great commercial value. For example, from the very beginning, Jia Yueting’s positioning of LeTV’s mobile phone was to attract users with video and become the entrance of LeTV’s ecological terminal, so LeTV’s mobile phone has been sold below the cost price. (April 2015, China Entrepreneur Magazine, "Don Quixote • Jia: The Lonely Journey of the Subverter.

Letv’s typical imagination of "ecological opposition" is: in the stadium scene, there is a moment when people have the strongest desire to buy — — When you see Messi kick the ball into the goal, then you will think, I’ll buy a pair of shoes like this!

Later we learned that it was a dream.

The out-of-control LeTV Ecology can only make a fuss about related party transactions, deferred income tax and equity distribution of subsidiaries, and hide losses.

However, LeTV’s failed attempt does not mean that the development prospect of Xiaomi Ecology is gloomy. Xiaomi’s ecological logic is much simpler and more effective: Xiaomi does not expect related transactions between eco-chain enterprises to bring income (LeTV’s case proves that this income is unreliable), but uses the eco-chain to improve the overall market efficiency.

Moreover, there is always a core in Xiaomi’s ecological chain — — Xiaomi mobile phone and Xiaomi brand values, which provide fast-growing resources and channels for other start-ups. Unlike the "loss-making" sales of LeTV’s mobile phone, Xiaomi’s mobile phone has always been making money, although it claims low gross profit margin.

In the early days of the rapid growth of Xiaomi’s mobile phone, some suppliers complained that Xiaomi’s "Internet thinking" was good, but it was predatory, which depressed the profit margin of supply chain enterprises. However, using the eco-chain strategy, as of the first quarter of 2018, Xiaomi has brought more than 210 eco-chain enterprises into its own track, further enhancing its power position in market negotiations, and also allowing suppliers who cooperate with Xiaomi to have more orders.

It can be said that Xiaomi effectively uses his power to eliminate the dissatisfaction of suppliers, and at the same time, it is further transmitting Xiaomi’s values — — There will be a large number of users coming with the price reduction, which is the reappearance of Xiaomi’s cognition of market power in the industrial chain relationship.

In December 2015, Lei Jun proposed that the ecological chain should be an independent brand. Three months later, "Mijia" was released.To some extent, Xiaomi’s "Mijia" ecological chain system can be regarded as the intelligent hardware version of the App Store.The App Store launched by Apple in 2008 is a successful example of a single enterprise establishing an ecosystem, which determines the acquisition form of applications and services in the era of mobile Internet.If the smart hardware in the future is also the first choice to enter the track of "Mijia", the growth space of Xiaomi will be limitless.

3. Under the rule of Xiaomi

For an ecosystem, win-win is the premise of growth. An ecological chain that can continuously share benefits for all participants is fundamentally sustainable.

Then, can everyone achieve a win-win situation in the Xiaomi ecological chain?

The answer is yes.

First of all, the ecological chain has changed the relationship between Xiaomi and other startups and reduced the future risks of Xiaomi.

In the early days, Xiaomi’s market power cognitive boundary of "high quality, high value and high cost performance" not only affected the big manufacturers it aimed at, but also affected the future of many entrepreneurial projects.

In 2014, at the peak of domestic intelligent hardware entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs, investors and entrepreneurs often asked the same question, "If Xiaomi made your product, how would you respond?"

This antagonism leads to many situations of "cottage" millet. In a dialogue with senior government officials in 2015, Lei Jun also specifically mentioned the proliferation of counterfeit goods. Because of Xiaomi’s strong influence in the hearts of consumers, some startups in the south began to make Xiaomi’s mobile phones and accessories, which caused many problems. Xiaomi once asked the government to increase anti-counterfeiting efforts.

However, with the development of Xiaomi’s ecological chain, these voices have gradually weakened. If you can get Xiaomi’s investment and guidance, why bother to "cottage" it?

This reflects the power of Xiaomi ecological chain.

The future enemies of a company include not only those visible competitors, but also those startups that don’t know where they are. It is impossible to solve the problem simply by relying on competitive strategy. Xiaomi makes its controllable organizational boundary always coincide with the market boundary through the ecological chain, thus effectively achieving the purpose of eliminating competition, improving penetration and preventing entry, which is a very clever market power strategy.

Secondly, the ecological chain has effectively cultivated Xiaomi’s allies in values.

Liu De, the co-founder of Xiaomi in charge of the ecological chain, is a designer and once worked in the Whampoa Military Academy of China Industrial Designers — — University of Science and Technology Beijing is the head of the Department of Industrial Design, and he leads the team in charge of the design of Xiaomi mobile phone.

Liu De divides Xiaomi’s ecological chain into three layers: the innermost layer is the basic hardware such as mobile phone and TV, which is closed and Xiaomi can only do it himself; The second layer is the product directly related to it — — Headphones, charging treasures, bracelets, and IOT devices such as rice cookers, electric kettles, and smart desk lamps are semi-open; The outermost layer is household consumables, such as rice related to rice cookers, filter elements related to purifiers, etc. Xiaomi does not do it himself. The products of the first two floors are also part of Xiaomi’s new retail channel, which can sell the products of the third floor. For example, you can place an order to buy filter elements on the APP page of Xiaomi air purifier.

Xiaomi requires every product to be explosive, and Liu De’s team will personally participate in the design of eco-chain products, and use Xiaomi’s rapid penetration of the market to help these products quickly occupy the market.

In addition to the support of capital and supply chain, Xiaomi will also pass on some explosive methodologies, such as how to simplify the design of a product, reduce costs and meet 80% of the needs of 80% users. When mi band was launched that year, Xiaomi asked the manufacturer Huami Technology to focus on two things — — Reduce power consumption, increase viscosity and improve design. When smart wearable devices cost thousands of dollars in foreign countries, Huami Technology launched the first generation mi band in 79 yuan, which quickly became popular.

The well-known self-media curiosity daily has analyzed the reasons for the success of Huami Technology. They found that in terms of sales expense ratio, relying on Xiaomi’s channel and word-of-mouth marketing, the sales expense of Huami accounted for less than 2% of revenue for a long time, while its peer benchmarking manufacturer Fitbit was nearly 25%. With the help of Xiaomi ecological chain, its procurement cost is also nearly 50% lower than Fitbit.

In order to support the cost of sales, Fitbit’s gross profit margin has been maintained at around 40%. However, the gross profit margin of Huami was only 12.3% and the net profit margin was -4.2% when it produced the first generation of mi band, so it was able to create explosions and cultivate users at a very low price. After the launch of Xiaomi’s second-generation bracelet in mid-2016, the price was raised from 79 yuan to 149 yuan, and the net profit rate of Huami Technology became positive. Therefore, in just three years, the strength of Huami, after being a large-scale brand, has undergone a major reversal compared with Fitbit: the net interest rate of Huami has risen to 8.15%; After 2015, Fitbit’s revenue continued to decline and it fell into a loss.

Of course, there are also some eco-chain enterprises that don’t like to survive in this system. Because the Xiaomi ecological chain emphasizes cost performance, both Lei Jun and others in the company like to say, "The biggest disadvantage of this product is that it is too cheap!" It is difficult for these enterprises to obtain higher gross profit within the Xiaomi ecological chain.

In this respect, Xiaomi is also different from Wal-Mart. The ecological chain is an open platform, which only participates in the incubation of start-ups from 0 to 1, and the later development is not limited. Entrepreneurs can make their own brands outside the ecological chain, and it doesn’t matter if they don’t even accept Xiaomi’s investment. Xiaomi is not so much a channel provider as a product gathering place with common values.

With the help of ecological chain, Xiaomi has effectively constructed the resource boundary of its own market power, so its market position is more stable.


05

Replay


The previous article is magnificently about 20,000 words, but it is actually just studying a problem:What is the reason why Xiaomi can succeed in the market?

Around this problem, we have two findings:

First of all, we find that power strategy, not competition strategy, is leading the growth of Xiaomi.

As mentioned above, the growth of Xiaomi is a textbook case of market expansion. As a start-up, they have established a set of.Market power system in the name of "Xiaomi mode": establish the brand identity in the era of mobile internet with cost performance and explosion rate, and use this to push back the improvement of organizational efficiency and establish the cognitive boundary of power; Turn customers into "fans" and let them participate in the design and promotion of products, so as to form the relationship boundary of enterprise market power; Build an ecological chain by means of venture capital, share the risk of market demand with small hardware startups, accelerate their growth and expand the resource boundary of enterprise market power.

It is this innovative system that distinguishes Xiaomi from many mobile phone manufacturers, builds and cultivates its own exclusive market, and grows step by step in the environment surrounded by wolves, dancing with the wind and soaring to the top.

From the beginning to the end, Xiaomi’s market decision is to occupy the market "mainly with me". We have not found that Xiaomi has taken the initiative to make competitive efforts to find the gap of opponents or build barriers to prevent opponents from attacking. But because of this, they always hold the initiative of the market.

In the dark horse college of entrepreneurship, according to the mental model, entrepreneurs are divided into two categories: heaven school and earth school. Xiaomi can be said to be a typical Tianpai company. Huawei and ZTE have been communication enterprises for 20 years, and Lenovo, OPPO, vivo and other companies also have rich experience in manufacturing and selling consumer electronic products, all of which are naturally grown in this industry. But Xiaomi is not, Xiaomi is a real heterogeneous — — It is more like the spokesperson of the future Internet product model in today’s social ecology — — If you believe Lei Jun’s prediction.

Generally speaking, Tianpai startups succeed in the market, or they seize the opportunity of social change and create a new industry, such as Ali; Either have some independent innovative technologies and find ways to realize them, such as Baidu. Because it is difficult to break through the bottleneck of resources and relationships, Tianpai startups are generally afraid of fighting with incumbent enterprises in the traditional business environment. But Xiaomi is different. It brings the idea of Tianpai entrepreneurs to the world of local giants and proves itself in the market struggle.

Xiaomi’s method of winning the struggle, specifically, Xiaomi’s method of building its own power in the market through values, rice flour and ecological chain, is more practical for today’s entrepreneurs. Because the opportunities of using innovative tools to change the world in the initial stage of the Internet have become less and less, entrepreneurs are now facing more situations, how to take root in an industry and do their best to create a new and successful company. Xiaomi is an example in this respect.

Secondly, we believe that Xiaomi’s achievements also challenge the traditional company value evaluation system.

In 1970, Milton Friedman, an economist, published a famous article in The new york Times Magazine: Corporate social responsibility is to improve profits. This creed, together with the hypothesis of "rational man" in economics, supports the continuous improvement of corporate profits and the legalization of personal income of shareholders and executives.

However, Drucker, a master of management, does not agree with this view. In his view, profit is the result and should not be the purpose of management. It is the reward given to the owner by the enterprise for its continuous operation, but the purpose of the enterprise must exist in the society.

Xiaomi is such a Drucker-style enterprise instead of Friedman-style enterprise. It is a dream enterprise, not a profit machine, but a startup company that wants to create value for society.

In Xiaomi’s business model, user reputation is the origin, cost performance is the engine, and social media is the accelerator. Everything Xiaomi does is to provide products that are "touching and affordable", and he believes that actively reducing the gross profit margin of hardware will eventually bring the desired business value.

According to traditional business ethics, all enterprises will try their best to avoid the situation of zero gross profit, because that means that your company has no barriers in the market.

But Xiaomi did the opposite. It took the initiative to reduce the gross profit, which was consistent with the words of Amazon founder Bezos:"A large company with low gross profit that can survive is itself the biggest moat."However, it is a big challenge to traditional business values.

Why should an enterprise exist? This involves the fundamental definition of enterprise and even entrepreneur value. The expectations of shareholders are different from the interests of enterprises, and the goal of investors is only to make money.

Interestingly, when Xiaomi went public, most media in China, even a large number of self-media, always unconsciously worried about investors.Look at the value of millet simply from the perspective of making money.People ask Lei Jun again and again, where is the moat, where is the revenue growth point and where is the profit? butFew people study the value of millet from the perspective of society and market. However, few people in the media are real investors in Xiaomi.

In our opinion, the value of Xiaomi lies in the value it creates for users. Xiaomi can become Xiaomi because it is a real market revolutionary and a great entrepreneurial experiment that is still going on.

Moreover, the traditional evaluation system can not reflect the possible changes in the future and the value of entrepreneurs’ personal factors to the company.

On the road to Xiaomi’s success, there are huge contingency factors: if Xiaomi didn’t just catch up with the tide of "double innovation" and loose capital environment in the first four years and rush to the "stratosphere" with the fastest speed, would it be able to survive the twists and turns in 2015-2016? If Lei Jun hadn’t happened to be the president and angel investor of Jinshan, could Xiaomi have won the unthinking support of so many netizens and business partners at first, thus enjoying loyalty and reputation? These questions are hard to answer.

But if we look at it from another angle, it is precisely because the founder of Xiaomi is Lei Jun that it can have these accidental opportunities. Lei Jun’s upward motivation, adherence to Xiaomi’s values, familiarity with the method of "lean entrepreneurship" and his resources, contacts and personality are the necessary conditions for all future opportunities of Xiaomi.

In fact, it is precisely the combination of the founder’s personal characteristics and the entrepreneurial methodology based on uncertainty that makes the startup explode with great energy. Wu Xiaobo, a media person who spent $200,000 to buy Xiaomi shares, said, "Lei Jun himself is the biggest premium of Xiaomi".

For an ongoing change, people always overestimate the change it will cause in the next year, but underestimate its long-term impact.

Looking back now, as Lei Jun said in an open letter on the eve of listing: "In the past eight years, the cottage in China has been completely eliminated; China’s smart phones and smart hardware are getting better and better in quality and cheaper in price, and they are rising strongly in the world … … Xiaomi has also become the fourth largest smartphone manufacturer in the world, changing more than 100 industries through eco-chain products. "

Isn’t it an extraordinary market achievement for a startup company to grow from zero to the fourth place in the world in eight years in a long-standing mainstream battlefield?

It should be noted that this paper only studies Xiaomi as a startup company. When a company gets bigger and bigger, especially after listing, it is likely that some decisions that helped it succeed will no longer apply. According to the case center of Entrepreneurship Dark Horse College, in the future market, Xiaomi still faces at least four main risks:

1) Risk of explosives.Xiaomi’s low gross profit strategy determines that each of their products must be explosive, and the cost should be diluted by explosive products, otherwise it will lose money. Take Xiaomi air purifier as an example, the mold opening cost is 10 million. If only 10,000 units are sold, the cost of each unit will increase by 1,000 yuan. Only after the sales volume can reach millions of units can this cost be reduced to a negligible level. This requires that every product of Xiaomi must be based on the needs of a large number of users, and a large number of people will buy it. However, the preferences of modern users can easily migrate with the head IP, and the demand for diversification is also increasing. The emergence of explosions is very accidental. Once a heavyweight product fails to become an explosive product, Xiaomi may fall into huge financial risks.

2) Fan risk.Xiaomi should become both a popular company and a fan culture company. The contradiction here is, is the growth of fans sustainable? Every company can maintain a limited number of fans. If the number of fans stops growing, the growth space of Xiaomi’s subsequent Internet services and intelligent hardware products will be greatly tested, and Xiaomi will lose its difference from other mobile phone manufacturers. No matter from the perspective of future development or current market, Xiaomi needs new means to interact with users and complete new traffic conversion.

3) Main channel risk.Xiaomi’s ecological chain is a big stove, and Xiaomi’s own brand is a heat source. With waste heat, the surrounding intelligent hardware can be made. But the outside world defines an enterprise, or more from its main channel. Especially in the capital market, I prefer "Friedman-style" enterprises, and it is difficult to understand the ecological practices of startups. Letv’s case is not to be discussed. Since 2014, Haier has launched a "micro-model" to build an entrepreneurial ecosystem and achieved good results. From the beginning of 2014 to the present, Haier’s revenue has doubled, its profit has increased by 70%, and its share price has doubled. However, in the same period, Gree focused on its main business, its revenue didn’t change much, its profit doubled, but its stock price quadrupled. Therefore, no matter how great achievements Xiaomi’s ecological chain has made, the valuation of Xiaomi may be defined more according to its position in the main channel in the capital market.

4) Technical risks.Every startup company will enter the "new normal" of slow growth sooner or later after experiencing a high-speed growth period. At that time, companies without the accumulation of key core technologies cannot have stable market power. The next development of Xiaomi needs to get more source innovations from the outside to the inside, including hard technology.

For a startup, all success is temporary. The greater the achievements in the past, the greater the challenges in the future.

Today, the development of Xiaomi has changed from the company that wanted to "follow the trend" and take a ride on the mobile Internet to the standard-bearer who promoted the concept of "touching people’s hearts and being kind in price". But as of 2017, Xiaomi’s share in the global mobile phone market is still only 6.4%. This shows that changing people’s inherent cognition is the most difficult thing in the world. Even if you are sincerely starting from users, you will not let all users become your fans. This is also the fate of most reformers in history — — There were countless people who wanted to change the world, and eventually they became a supplement to the diversity of the original world.

Today, the mobile Internet has become much more complicated than what Xiaomi imagined when he was born. In the early days of Internet application, companies that master Internet tools in advance may be able to dig the "first bucket of gold" more easily, but in the future, all companies will be Internet companies.

As time goes by, everything that God has given a person will be gradually taken back, talent and identity will lose their aura, fans will get old, fashion trends will change, and all that can be left is what they have fought for at the moment.

Lei Jun said: Kind people will not be too bad luck. We wish Lei Jun good luck! Xiaomi, good luck!

[References]

[1] Professor Catherine &bull of Stanford University; M• Eisenhardt, Market Construction and Boundary Shaping: Entrepreneurial Power in the nascent market (translated by Yu Ming, Guanghua, Peking University).

[2] Xu Xiaoping, a teacher of Zhenge Fund, talked about Entrepreneurship several times.

[3] Luo Xiaoqu, Ph.D. of Stanford University and former chief strategy officer of the dark horse of entrepreneurship, has made relevant research results on "entrepreneurship ecology".

[4] Notes of Xiaomi, Li Wanqiang, Hong Feng, Gao Ziguang and other partners and executives in the dark horse college of entrepreneurship.

[5] Xiaomi’s internal marketing manual "Sense of Participation" and experience collection "Notes on Xiaomi’s Ecological Chain Battlefield".

[6] Caitlin • Muff, Thomas • Dilik et al., Management Education for the Benefit of the World.

[7] Zhou Hang, Shunwei Capital; Feng Weidong, Tiantu Capital; Dai Saiying, founder of three dads; Liu Jianhong, Peng Gang, former senior executives of LeTV; etc. in the dark horse college of entrepreneurship.

[8] Major media reported publicly.

[For more reading, see Article 12.

Values, Rice Flour and Ecological Chain: Xiaomi’s Market Power Game (I)

Values, Rice Flour and Ecological Chain: Xiaomi’s Market Power Game (Ⅱ)

 

The 20th military coup staged by the Thai military in modern times has detained government officials.

According to Agence France-Presse, the Thai military leader announced in a live television broadcast on the 22nd that a military coup would be launched from that day, and the military-controlled peacekeeping command announced that it would seize all the powers of the caretaker government to "prevent further conflicts and sacrifices". This is the 20th military coup in Thailand since 1932.

Thailand’s "National Daily" website also reported that Thai military leader Ba Yu announced a military coup in a live TV broadcast at 5 pm local time on the 22nd (6 pm Beijing time). Ba Yu said that the armed forces are about to seize power after months of political turmoil.

He said that in order to get the country back to normal order as soon as possible, the Thai National Peacekeeping Committee, composed of the military, the Thai armed forces, the air force and the police, needs to seize power at 4: 30 pm on May 22 (5: 30 pm Beijing time).

On May 22nd, the meeting of Thai military, caretaker government, House of Lords, Election Committee, People’s Committee for Thai Party, Democratic Party, anti-government organization and Anti-dictatorship Democratic Alliance (Red Shirt Army) broke down, and the leaders of the seven organizations attending the meeting were controlled by the military and left the Army Club in a van, temporarily missing. According to Xinhua News Agency, the Thai military has detained the demonstration leaders and government officials who participated in the talks.

At present, the street fighting between the "Yellow Shirt Army" and the "Red Shirt Army" in Thailand has basically stopped.

Soldiers and monks on the streets of Thailand

Soldiers and monks on the streets of Thailand

During the feudal monarchy in Thailand, except for large-scale foreign military aggression, the change of dynasties was relatively stable. However, after the first military coup in June 1932, Thailand has had 20 military coups, promulgated 17 constitutions, held 26 general elections and formed about 50 cabinets. It can be said that the modern history of Thailand is a history of military coup.

Attachment: List of coup history in Thailand since 1932

The first coup: From June 24th to June 27th, 1932, in order to change the autocratic monarchy, the People’s Party from the army launched a coup, and finally the People’s Party Committee appointed the conservative judge Piet Manubagong as the Prime Minister, also known as the Constitutional Revolution in Thailand.

Second coup: On June 20, 1933, contradictions occurred within the People’s Party, and finally the coup leader Pierre Paavon became the prime minister, and the strongman Mao Piwen began to emerge.

The third coup: from October 11 to October 15, 1933, the royal family staged a coup to urge the military government to hand over power, which was finally suppressed, and the status of Mao Piwen rose rapidly thereafter.

The fourth coup: On November 8, 1947, the old department of Mao Piwen accused the literati regime of being responsible for the death of King Rama VIII, and Mao Piwen went out again.

Fifth coup: On October 1, 1948, factional struggle within the military triggered a coup, and the coup leader was finally arrested. 

Sixth coup: On February 26, 1949, due to dissatisfaction with the accusation of the death of King Rama VIII, Thai navy soldiers staged a coup, and the coup leader was finally arrested. 

Seventh coup d’ é tat: From June 29th to July 2nd, 1951, the Thai navy staged a coup to protest against the government’s reduction of naval expenditure, which was finally suppressed by force.

Eighth coup: On November 29th, 1951, the military expressed dissatisfaction with the 1949 Constitution, which was eventually abolished and restored to the 1932 Constitution.

Ninth coup d’ é tat: On September 16th, 1957, due to fraud in the general election, the army staged a coup to overthrow the government of Mao Piwen and appointed a civilian as the prime minister of the transitional government.

Tenth coup: On October 20th, 1958, because the Prime Minister was unable to cope with the internal contradictions of the government, the military staged another coup, and soldier Sarit Thanarat came to power and took over the state’s military and political power.

Eleventh coup: On November 17, 1971, thanom kittikachorn, the prime minister of the military government, staged a coup against the parliament’s revision of the military government budget. In 1968, the constitution was abolished and the parliament was dissolved.

Twelfth coup: On October 14, 1973, King Bhumibol announced that he would withdraw his support for the military government, and thanom kittikachorn had to go into exile.

13th coup d’ é tat: On October 6, 1976, Admiral Chaloryoo of the Ministry of National Defense staged a coup on the pretext that there were communist party people in the cabinet, and then the military appointed Tanin Gaiwei, a conservative judge, to move out as prime minister, and the army actually took power, and communist party, Thailand, went downhill from then on.

14th coup d’ é tat: On March 26th, 1977, different factions in the army staged a coup d’ é tat over the distribution of military posts. The coup d’ é tat was shattered after only six hours, and the mastermind, General Chala, was executed.

Fifteenth coup: On October 20, 1977, Admiral Shae Charoru staged a coup because the Prime Minister interfered with military affairs. After the coup was successful, General Jiangsa Chamanan was appointed as Prime Minister.

Sixteenth coup: From April 1 to April 3, 1981, Chipatima, deputy chief of staff of the Army, staged a military coup because of differences of opinion, which was finally suppressed by troops loyal to the government.

Seventeenth coup: Manon, one of the leaders of the 16th coup in September, 1985, was unwilling to fail in the coup again, and finally the coup failed, and many senior Thai officials were arrested for being involved in this matter.

18th coup: On February 23rd, 1991, the government led by General chatichai choonhavan was overthrown by the military, and the regime fell into the hands of the National Peacekeeping Commission led by General Sunthorn Khongsompong.

19th coup d’ é tat: From September 19th to September 21st, 2006, the economic problems of Thaksin family triggered a political crisis. The military announced the dissolution of the cabinet led by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and the military organization took over the state power.

Twentieth coup: On May 22nd, 2014, Thai military leaders announced that they would seize all the powers of the caretaker government.

Supreme Leader Anhui investigates and pays attention to several major events.

  [When learning is going on] From April 24th to 27th, the Supreme Leader made an investigation in Anhui. He came to Lu ‘an, Chuzhou, Hefei and other places, and went deep into rural areas, enterprises, universities and scientific research and cultural units. What major issues did the top leaders talk about in this survey? The original brand column "Workshop" of Xinhuanet’s "Learning in Progress" today launched "Several Major Events Concerned by the Supreme Leader Anhui Investigation" to sort it out for you.

  The general secretary is very busy, but he doesn’t forget to go deep into grassroots research during his busy schedule. In just four days in Anhui, the supreme leader went to the village to enter the house, go to school and listen to the report … … Non-stop, sleepless nights. In the investigation, he paid attention to several major events, all of which were connected with people’s livelihood and everything was related to the national movement.

  传承

  使红色基因渗进血液、浸入心扉

  4月24日至27日,中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席最高领袖在安徽调研。这是4月24日上午,最高领袖在六安市金寨县红军广场向革命烈士纪念塔敬献花篮。 新华社记者李涛摄

  位于大别山区的金寨县是最高领袖这次调研的第一站。来到这个中国革命的重要策源地、人民军队的重要发源地,最高领袖满怀深情地说,一寸山河一寸血,一抔热土一抔魂。我们要沿着革命前辈的足迹继续前行,把红色江山世世代代传下去。革命传统教育要从娃娃抓起,既注重知识灌输,又加强情感培育,使红色基因渗进血液、浸入心扉,引导广大青少年树立正确的世界观、人生观、价值观。

  扶贫

  必须横下一条心来抓

  老区人民生活怎么样,最高领袖一直牵挂于心。在金寨,他询措施、问落实,同大家一起算脱贫时间账。最高领袖指出,脱贫攻坚已进入啃硬骨头、攻坚拔寨的冲刺阶段,必须横下一条心来抓。要强化目标责任,坚持精准扶贫,认真落实每一个项目、每一项措施,全力做好脱贫攻坚工作,以行动兑现对人民的承诺。

  创新

  把创新作为最大政策

  4月24日至27日,中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席最高领袖在安徽调研。这是4月26日下午,最高领袖在中国科技大学图书馆与正在上自习的学生们亲切交谈。 新华社记者李学仁摄

  最高领袖十分重视创新驱动发展,将创新视为民族进步的灵魂。在中国科技大学、中科大先进技术研究院调研时,他强调,当今世界科技革命和产业变革方兴未艾,我们要增强使命感,把创新作为最大政策,奋起直追、迎头赶上。中国科技大学要勇于创新、敢于超越、力争一流,在人才培养和创新领域取得更加骄人的成绩,为国家现代化建设作出更大的贡献。

  改革

  改革要常讲常新

  4月24日至27日,中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席最高领袖在安徽调研。这是4月25日下午,最高领袖在滁州市凤阳县小岗村察看小麦长势。 新华社记者李学仁摄

  最高领袖来到闻名全国的大包干发源地凤阳县小岗村,重温了中国改革历程。他说,小岗村发生的翻天覆地的变化,是我国改革开放的一个缩影,看了让人感慨万千。他强调,实践证明,唯改革才有出路,改革要常讲常新。

  Leading demand development with new supply

  After listening to the work report of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee and the provincial government, the supreme leader pointed out that it is necessary to further emancipate and develop social productive forces, lead demand development with new supply, and cultivate new impetus and create new engines for sustained economic growth. Good ecological environment is the proper meaning of supply-side structural reform, and it is also an important criterion to evaluate the effectiveness of supply-side structural reform.

  Ensure that zero-employment families are dynamically "cleared"

  The supreme leader pointed out that in the current situation of increasing downward pressure on the economy and increasing contradictions in social issues, it is especially necessary to fulfill the basic responsibility of ensuring the basics, ensuring the bottom line and protecting people’s livelihood. With the continuous advancement of supply-side structural reforms, some employees will be laid off, so we should pay more attention to the employment problem and ensure that the dynamics of zero-employment families are "cleared".

  The blade breaks the word inward.

  The supreme leader stressed that the new round of reform is characterized by more hard bones, more tough battles and more cheese. To deepen the reform in an all-round way, we must first cut the blade inward and dare to make self-revolution. The key point is to break the word and face difficulties. We must fundamentally stimulate motivation and let the people have a sense of gain. Party committees and governments at all levels, as well as leading cadres at all levels, should put themselves into thinking, discussing and grasping reform, and strive to be the pioneers of reform. List reform topics and set reform measures, closely meet the needs of the masses, listen carefully to their opinions, and let the people make contributions and gain more benefits in the reform.

  food

  Farmers produce food and increase their income go hand in hand.

  Anhui is a big province of grain production. When you come to Anhui, you should naturally pay attention to grain production. In Xiaogang village, the top leader walked into the wheat field along the ridge to see the growth of wheat and understand the key points of planting management in high-yield demonstration fields. He stressed that it is necessary to optimize technical measures, implement supporting policies, protect farmers’ enthusiasm for growing grain, focus on improving the efficiency of grain production, and strive to achieve the organic unity of grain production development and economic strength enhancement in major grain producing areas, so that farmers can produce grain and increase their income simultaneously.

  education

  Be a "six haves" college student

  When meeting the students of the University of Science and Technology of China, the supreme leader was earnest. He said that youth is the future of the country and the hope of the nation. I hope that students will shoulder the responsibility of the times, hold high their ideal sails, calm down and study hard, and strive to practice the basic skills of life and career, so as to be college students with ideals and pursuits, be responsible and accomplished, and be quality and cultivated. We should learn from the outstanding scientists of the older generation in China, and strive for shine on you rather than blue.

  party constitution

  Party constitution is a general rule and always follows.

  The study and education of "two studies and one doing" is a major event in party building this year. How to learn? The supreme leader gave specific guidance. "Learn two things and do one thing", the foundation lies in learning, and we must first learn party constitution well. Party constitution is the party’s fundamental law, the general basis and follow-up for strictly administering the party in an all-round way, and the general rules and follow-up for all party member’s words and deeds.

  Learning from party constitution is the basic skill of party member.

  The whole party’s study and implementation of party constitution’s level determines the level of party member’s team’s party spirit cultivation, the level of cohesion and combat effectiveness of party organizations at all levels, and the level of comprehensive and strict management of the party. Whether senior cadres or ordinary party member, to be a qualified party member, studying and implementing party constitution is the first requirement.

  He said that learning from party constitution is the basic skill of all party member, and this lesson should be done frequently. To learn from party constitution, we should not only learn from the original, but also learn repeatedly, so as to know what it is, and we should contact with practical learning and think deeply about it, so as to know why it is.

  To contact the reality of six aspects:

  Contact the history of the party and the reality of the historical position and historical mission undertaken by the party today;

  Connecting the theoretical development of the party with the reality of strengthening ideals and beliefs today;

  Contact the basic line of the party and the reality of doing all the work well today;

  Contact the nature and purpose of the party and the reality of serving the people better today;

  Contact the obligation rights of party members and the reality of giving full play to party member’s vanguard and exemplary role today;

  Contact the party’s discipline and rules with the reality of solving outstanding problems in the party today.

Special issue of the People’s Daily on the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Party: the historical evolution of the central leading bodies.

  The Secretariat elected by the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China is composed of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi, and people call it the "Five Secretaries".

  With the magnificent and glorious history of 95 years, the central organization of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been adjusted and gradually improved from scratch, forming a party central organization with reasonable structure, complete setup and smooth operation. The central organization is the central organization of the party and the organizational core of the whole party. According to the current regulations of party constitution, the central organization of the Party includes the National Congress of the Party, the Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection elected by it; The Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee elected by the plenary session of the Central Committee; The Central Military Commission (CMC) decided by the Central Committee and the Central Secretariat nominated by Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and adopted by the plenary session of the Central Committee. It can be said that the evolution history of the party’s central organization is a condensed history of the party. This paper focuses on the historical evolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, its Standing Committee, the Central Secretariat and the Central Military Commission (CMC).

  The Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee and Central Secretariat.

  The Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee are important parts of the Party’s central organization and leading bodies that faithfully implement the line, principles and policies adopted by the Party’s National Congress and the resolutions of the plenary session of the Central Committee.

  The Secretariat of the Central Committee is the office of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee and an important organization of the CPC Central Committee.

  The first congress of the party

  Set the C.O. as the temporary central leading body.

  A major decision of the Party is not to set up the Central Executive Committee for the time being, but to set up the Central Bureau as the temporary leading body of the Central Committee, with secretaries and members. In November, 1921, in the name of the secretary of the C.O., the the Communist Party of China (CPC) C.O. Notice was issued to party organizations all over the country. This is the first document issued after the establishment of the central leading body. In 1922, for the first time, the Second National Congress of the Communist Party of China made more specific and clear provisions on the principles and policies of the Party’s organizational construction. Based on party constitution, the second Central Executive Committee of communist party, China, was elected as the leading body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, with its chairman. In 1923, the leading body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was the third executive committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). According to the provisions of the three major party constitution, the Central Executive Committee has a standing body, namely, the Central Bureau and the Central Commissioner. The Third National Congress of the Communist Party of China adopted the Organic Law of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which made specific provisions on the central organization, division of responsibilities and work system of the Party for the first time.

  The Fifth Congress of the Party

  The Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee were formally established.

  In November, 1924, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China established the Political Bureau for the first time, consisting of Chen Duxiu, Cai Hesen and Vygotsky. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau were formally established at the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee is the highest decision-making organ of the whole Party, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau is responsible for handling daily affairs. For the first time, the party’s decision-making organ and the organ responsible for daily work are divided into two institutions. This is a great contribution to the leadership system of the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Since then, in the evolution of the party’s central organization, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee has always existed in the sequence of central leading bodies, and his functions and status have not changed.

  The Party’s Sixth party constitution stipulates that the Central Committee and the Political Bureau "elect the Standing Committee to carry out their daily work". The Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee were elected at the First Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee.

  The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee

  First establishment of the Central Secretariat

  In January 1934, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was re-elected at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party, and the Central Secretariat was established at the same time. It is generally believed that the Secretariat of the Central Committee at that time was actually Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee. From September to November, 1938, after the Sixth Plenary Session of the enlarged Sixth Central Committee of the Party, The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) was officially replaced by the Central Secretariat. The Seventh National Congress of party constitution continued this institutional arrangement, stipulating that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee is the central guiding organ of the Party to guide all the work of the Party. The Secretariat of the Central Committee handles the daily work of the Central Committee under the the Political Bureau of the Central Committee Resolution. As a result, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was not elected at the Seventh National Congress. This system was used until the Eighth National Congress of the Party in 1956.

  The Secretariat elected by the Seventh National Congress is composed of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi. People call it the "Five Secretaries", which forms the first generation of the central leading collective of the Party and plays an important role in the history of the Party.

  Party’s Eighth National Congress

  Resume the establishment of the Politburo Standing Committee

  The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China adjusted the central organization of the Party and resumed the establishment of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The Eighth National Congress of party constitution stipulates: "The plenary session of the Central Committee of the Party elects the Standing Committees of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Secretariat", "the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee exercise the functions and powers of the Central Committee when the plenary session of the Central Committee is not in session" and "The Central Secretariat is under the leadership of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee to handle the daily work of the Central Committee". The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China elected a new central leading body.

  After the "Cultural Revolution" began, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, its Standing Committee and Secretariat were severely impacted. After the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee were restored to their original positions. Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the position and role of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee as central leading bodies have not changed.

  The Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party

  Restore the establishment of the Central Secretariat

  The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China determined the basic framework of the central leadership system, which had an important impact on the establishment of the central leadership system later. After the "Cultural Revolution", the Secretariat of the Central Committee stopped working, and it was not established at the 9th to 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

  In February 1980, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted the Resolution on the Establishment of the Central Secretariat, and resumed the establishment of the Central Secretariat as a regular working body under the leadership of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee. Members are directly elected by the Central Committee. The Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China once again wrote the establishment of the Central Secretariat into party constitution, followed the provisions of the resolution of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, and defined the establishment, production mode and functions of the Central Secretariat. The party constitution Amendment to the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China made appropriate amendments to the provisions on the establishment of the Central Secretariat. Since then, the provisions of the Central Secretariat have not changed.

  the Central Military Commission (CMC)

  The Central Military Commission (CMC) is the highest military leading organ of the Party, referred to as the Central Military Commission. It has experienced a complicated evolution and development process.

  The Ministry of Military Affairs was established in 1925.

  The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China established the Military Ministry in 1925, the Central Military Commission in 1926, and the Military (Military) Ministry after the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. In January 1931, according to the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee’s decision, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet was established in the Central Revolutionary Base. In November of the same year, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Soviet Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Central Revolutionary Military Commission) was established in the central revolutionary base area, which was the military leading body of the interim central government of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and chinese soviet republic.

  The Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China established a military commission.

  In August 1937, Luochuan Conference decided to form the Central Revolutionary Military Commission headed by Mao Zedong. The Seventh party constitution Congress of the Communist Party of China stipulated that the Central Committee should set up a military commission. On August 23rd, 1945, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee decided to form the new the Central Military Commission (CMC). In November 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided that the Central Military Commission should use the name of "China People’s Revolutionary Military Commission" when issuing orders to the public.

  In 1959, the Central Military Commission set up a standing committee member.

  In October 1949, the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People’s Government was established, and in September 1954, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee decided to re-establish CPC Central Military Commission. Since September 1959, the Central Military Commission has set up a standing committee until the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

  In 1983, the State Central Military Commission was established.

  Since June 1983, People’s Republic of China (PRC) the Central Military Commission (CMC) has been established according to the Constitution. The Central Military Commission of the Party and the Central Military Commission of the State are actually an institution, and their members and leadership functions are completely consistent. This leadership system with China characteristics ensures that the army is always under the absolute leadership of the Party.

  Written by: Zhang Dongming Visual Coordinator: Zhang Fangman

Shocking! Aerial photography of the Yellow River in Inner Mongolia has entered a critical period.

       CCTV News:At present, the Yellow River in Inner Mongolia has entered a critical period. Today (15th), the reporter saw from the air by helicopter that the ice melting in the frozen section of Inner Mongolia is close to half. At the same time, the reporter learned from the front-line headquarters of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region that the opening of the entire section of the Yellow River in Inner Mongolia this year may be later than last year.

       CCTV reporter Zhou Wei: "What we see now is the three sheng Public Water Control Project in Dengkou County, Inner Mongolia, where the river is wide and the traces of freezing have completely disappeared. This year, due to the high temperature, the Yellow River in Inner Mongolia started to open on February 19th, three days earlier than normal, and the total distance from Mahuanggou at the junction of Ningxia and Inner Mongolia is 160 kilometers, which has been fully opened.

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       From three sheng to Gongxia, the Yellow River enters the reach with many bends. In addition, the latitude in this area is basically between 48 and 50 degrees north latitude. Every spring, the ice density tends to be high, which brings flood control pressure to the downstream. Therefore, opening the river here marks that the Inner Mongolia section of the Yellow River has entered a critical period of ice prevention.

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       What we see now is the Sanhu River Estuary Hydrological Station in Wulate Qianqi, Inner Mongolia, which is 215 kilometers away from three sheng Gong. There are still large areas of ice on the river surface, and the main rivers are clear ditches. Clear ditch is the civilized part in the middle of the frozen river. If all these clear ditches are connected together, the river will be opened. At present, the Sanhu estuary has not been fully opened. If it is opened here, it means that the Inner Mongolia section of the Yellow River is halfway open. Up to today, the Inner Mongolia section of the Yellow River has been opened for 317 kilometers, which is approaching the Sanhu Estuary Hydrological Station. "

       Liu Danyang, spokesperson of the front-line headquarters of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, said: "(At present) the speed of river opening is about 20 kilometers per day. This year (the Inner Mongolia section of the Yellow River), the overall water level in the flood season is low, and the increment of reservoir storage is small. It is expected that the river opening time this year will be later (compared with 2018)."

       CCTV reporter Zhou Wei: "In 2018, the Inner Mongolia section of the Yellow River will be opened on March 18th. Eight days earlier than normal, it is expected that the opening time of the whole line will be close to normal this year. What we see now is the Baotou River section, where the water surface is open and the river surface gully clearing area is large, accounting for about 50% by visual inspection. Experts said that the white part of the river shows that the ice layer is thick and the color is light and black, which is the performance of melting ice and snow.

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       Flying further downstream from Baotou, the Yellow River enters more bends, and the river surface becomes narrower, and the number of highway and railway bridges suddenly increases. Experts said that these old bridges have small spans and many piers, which are easy to cause ice jam and dam formation. Therefore, the 150-kilometer section from Baotou to Toudaoguai Hydrological Station in Tuoketuo County, the Inner Mongolia section of the Yellow River, is the top priority of ice prevention and flood control.

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       The Inner Mongolia section of the Yellow River is 720 kilometers long. Turning down from the first road, the Yellow River enters the Shanxi-Shaanxi Grand Canyon, which belongs to the middle reaches of the Yellow River. The front-line headquarters of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region predicts that by the end of this month, the entire section of the Yellow River in Inner Mongolia will be thawed and opened. "

Sanya, Hainan adjusted the high-risk area to 2 and the medium-risk area to 4.

  On September 19th, the reporter learned from the epidemic prevention and control headquarters of novel coronavirus, Sanya City, Hainan Province that according to the current needs of epidemic prevention and control work in Sanya City, according to the relevant provisions of the novel coronavirus Prevention and Control Plan (Ninth Edition), a comprehensive group of joint prevention and control mechanisms for novel coronavirus epidemic in the State Council, after the expert group judged, the epidemic prevention and control headquarters of Sanya City decided to adjust the areas such as Buildings 79, 81 and 83 of Yefeng Lane in Hongqi Street Community to low-risk areas. Since the announcement was issued, the high-risk areas have been adjusted to 2. Areas other than high and medium risk areas are low risk areas.

  Take sealing and control measures for high-risk areas: stay indoors and provide on-site service. There were no new infections in the area for 7 consecutive days, and all the people in the risk area were negative after completing a round of nucleic acid screening on the 7 th day, which was reduced to a medium risk area; For three consecutive days, no new infections were reduced to a low-risk area.

  Take control measures for the medium-risk area: time-sharing and orderly, current limiting in different areas, and taking things at different peaks. There were no new infections in the area for 7 consecutive days, and all the people in the risk area were negative after completing a round of nucleic acid screening on the 7 th day, which was reduced to a low-risk area.

  If residents in high and medium risk areas encounter difficulties in living and seeking medical treatment, they can call the Sanya municipal government service hotline 12345.

  (Reporter Ma Li, General Desk)

Regulations on safety management of reservoir dams

Regulations on safety management of reservoir dams

  (Promulgated by Order No.77 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on March 22, 1991 and revised according to the Decision of the State Council on Abolishing and Amending Some Administrative Regulations on January 8, 2011)

Chapter I General Principles

  the first In order to strengthen the safety management of reservoir dams and ensure the safety of people’s lives and property and socialist construction, these Regulations are formulated in accordance with the Water Law of People’s Republic of China (PRC).
  the second These Regulations shall apply to reservoir dams (hereinafter referred to as dams) with a dam height of more than 15 meters or a storage capacity of more than 1 million cubic meters in People’s Republic of China (PRC). Dams include permanent water retaining structures and flood discharge, water conveyance and ship passing structures that are used in conjunction with them.
  Dam height below 15 meters, more than 10 meters or storage capacity below 1 million cubic meters and above 100,000 cubic meters, which is potentially dangerous to the safety of important towns, traffic trunk lines, important military facilities and industrial and mining areas, shall be managed with reference to these regulations.
  Article The water administrative department of the State Council shall, jointly with the relevant departments of the State Council, supervise the dam safety throughout the country. The water administrative department of the local people’s government at or above the county level shall, jointly with the relevant competent departments, supervise the dam safety within their respective administrative areas.
  Water conservancy, energy, construction, transportation, agriculture and other relevant departments at all levels are the competent departments of dams under their jurisdiction.
  Article 4 The people’s governments at all levels and their dam authorities shall be responsible for the safety of dams under their jurisdiction.
  Article 5 The construction and management of dams should follow the principle of safety first.
  Article 6 All units and individuals have the obligation to protect dam safety.

Chapter II Construction of Large Dams

  Article 7 The construction of dams must conform to the technical standards for dam safety formulated by the water administrative department of the State Council in conjunction with the relevant dam authorities.
  Article 8 Engineering design is necessary to build a dam. The engineering design of the dam must be undertaken by units with corresponding qualification certificates.
  The engineering design of a dam shall include the design of management facilities such as engineering observation, communication, power, lighting, transportation and fire fighting.
  Article 9 Dam construction must be undertaken by units with corresponding qualification certificates. The dam construction unit must carry out the construction in accordance with the design documents, drawing requirements and relevant technical standards stipulated in the construction contract.
  The construction unit and design unit shall send representatives to supervise and inspect the construction quality. If the quality does not meet the design requirements, it must be reworked or remedial measures taken.
  Article 10 When building a dam, the construction unit shall, in accordance with the approved design, request the people’s government at or above the county level to delimit the scope of management and protection in accordance with state regulations and set up signs.
  Where the scope of management and protection has not been delineated for the built dam, the competent department of the dam shall, according to the needs of safety management, submit it to the people’s government at or above the county level for delineation.
  Article 11 After the dam starts, the dam administrative department shall set up a dam management unit, which will participate in the quality inspection, dam division, sub-project acceptance and water storage acceptance in accordance with the acceptance procedures of the project capital construction.
  After the completion of the dam, the construction unit shall apply to the competent department of the dam for organization and acceptance.

Chapter III Management of Large Dams

  Article 12 Dams and their facilities are protected by the state, and no unit or individual may occupy or destroy them. The dam management unit shall strengthen the safety and security of the dam.
  Article 13 It is forbidden to carry out activities that endanger dam safety, such as blasting, drilling wells, quarrying, mining, dredging, borrowing soil and repairing graves, within the scope of dam management and protection.
  Article 14 Non-dam management personnel shall not operate the flood discharge gate, water conveyance gate and other facilities of the dam, and the dam management personnel shall abide by the relevant rules and regulations when operating. No unit or individual is allowed to interfere with the normal management of the dam.
  Article 15 It is forbidden to cut trees in the catchment area of the dam, and to open up wasteland on steep slopes and other activities that lead to reservoir siltation. It is forbidden to reclaim land in the reservoir area and carry out activities that endanger the mountain, such as quarrying and borrowing soil.
  Article 16 If the dam crest really needs to be used as a highway, it must be scientifically demonstrated and approved by the dam authorities, and corresponding safety maintenance measures should be taken.
  Article 17 It is forbidden to build docks, channels, pile up sundries and dry grain and grass in the dam. The construction of wharves and fish ponds within the scope of dam management and protection shall be approved by the competent department of the dam, and a certain distance shall be kept from the dam foot and the drainage and water delivery structures, which shall not affect the dam safety, project management and emergency rescue work.
  Article 18 The competent department of dam shall be equipped with dam safety management personnel with corresponding professional level.
  Dam management units shall establish and improve safety management rules and regulations.
  Article 19 Dam management units must carry out safety monitoring and inspection of dams in accordance with relevant technical standards; The monitoring data should be sorted out and analyzed in time to keep abreast of the dam operation. When abnormal phenomena and unsafe factors are found, the dam management unit shall immediately report to the competent department of the dam and take timely measures.
  Article 20 The dam management unit must do a good job in the maintenance and repair of the dam to ensure that the dam and gate opening and closing equipment are in good condition.
  Article 21 The operation of the dam must give full play to its comprehensive benefits on the premise of ensuring safety. The dam management unit shall conduct the operation of the reservoir according to the approved plan and the instructions of the dam authorities.
  In flood season, the comprehensive utilization of reservoirs must be subject to the unified command of flood control headquarters; The flood control capacity above the flood limit level and the flood dispatching operation of reservoirs mainly for power generation must obey the unified command of the flood control headquarters.
  No unit or individual may illegally interfere with the operation of reservoirs.
  Article 22 The competent department of the dam shall establish a regular safety inspection and appraisal system for the dam.
  Before and after the flood season, and after the occurrence of storms, rainstorms, catastrophic floods or strong earthquakes, the dam authorities shall organize inspections on the safety of dams under their jurisdiction.
  Article 23 The dam authorities shall register the dams under their jurisdiction on schedule and establish technical files. Measures for dam registration shall be formulated by the water administrative department of the State Council jointly with relevant departments.
  Article 24 Dam management units and relevant departments shall make preparations for flood control and emergency rescue materials and forecast meteorological and hydrological conditions, and ensure smooth communication between the dam management units and the dam authorities and the flood control headquarters at higher levels.
  Article 25 When the dam shows signs of danger, the dam management unit shall immediately report to the competent department of the dam and the flood control headquarters at a higher level, and take rescue measures; When there is danger of dam collapse, all measures should be taken to give an alarm to the expected dam collapse flooded area and do a good job of transfer.

Chapter IV Management of Dangerous Dams

  Article 26 For dangerous dams that have not yet reached the design flood standards, seismic fortification standards or have serious quality defects, the dam authorities shall organize relevant units to classify them, take measures such as reinforcement, or abandon them for reconstruction.
  Before the reinforcement of a dangerous dam, the dam management unit shall formulate emergency measures to protect the dam; If it is necessary to change the original design operation mode after demonstration, it shall be submitted to the dam authority for examination and approval.
  Article 27 The dam authorities shall formulate a reinforcement plan for the dangerous dams under their jurisdiction that need to be reinforced, and eliminate the danger within a time limit; The relevant people’s governments shall give priority to the required funds and materials.
  The reinforcement of dangerous dams must be designed by units with corresponding design qualification certificates, and implemented after examination and approval. After the reinforcement of dangerous dams is completed, the dam authorities shall organize the acceptance.
  Article 28 The competent department of dams shall organize relevant units to estimate the possible dam collapse mode and inundation range of dangerous dams, formulate emergency plans and report them to the flood control headquarters for approval.

Chapter V Penalty Rules

  Article 29 In violation of the provisions of these regulations, any of the following acts shall be ordered by the dam authorities to stop the illegal act, compensate for the losses, take remedial measures and may be fined; Should be given administrative penalties for public security, the public security organs shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the "People’s Republic of China (PRC) Public Security Administration Punishment Law"; If the case constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility shall be investigated according to law:
  (a) the destruction of the dam or its observation, communication, power, lighting, transportation, fire control and other management facilities;
  (two) blasting, drilling wells, quarrying, mining, earth borrowing, dredging, grave repair and other activities endangering dam safety within the scope of dam management and protection;
  (three) unauthorized operation of the dam flood gate, water gate and other facilities, undermining the normal operation of the dam;
  (4) Reclaiming land in the reservoir area;
  (five) the construction of docks, channels or debris piled up in the dam, drying grain and grass;
  (six) unauthorized construction of docks and fish ponds within the scope of dam management and protection.
  Article 30 Whoever steals or robs dam engineering facilities and equipment shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Law.
  Article 31 Due to survey and design errors, poor construction quality, improper use of dispatching and abuse of power, dereliction of duty, resulting in dam accidents, the unit to which they belong or the competent authorities at a higher level shall give administrative sanctions to the responsible personnel; If a crime is constituted, criminal responsibility shall be investigated according to law.
  Article 32 If a party refuses to accept the decision on administrative punishment, it may, within 15 days from the date of receiving the notice of punishment, apply for reconsideration to the organ at the next higher level of the organ that made the decision on punishment; Anyone who refuses to accept the reconsideration decision may bring a suit in a people’s court within 15 days from the date of receiving the reconsideration decision. The parties may also directly bring a suit in a people’s court within 15 days from the date of receiving the notice of punishment. If a party fails to apply for reconsideration or bring a suit in a people’s court within the time limit and fails to perform the punishment decision, the organ that made the punishment decision shall apply to the people’s court for compulsory execution.
  Refuses to accept the punishment of public security management, in accordance with the provisions of the "People’s Republic of China (PRC) Public Security Management Punishment Law".

Chapter VI Supplementary Provisions

  Article 33 The relevant departments of the State Council and the people’s governments of all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government may formulate detailed rules for implementation according to these Regulations.
  Article 34 These Regulations shall come into force as of the date of promulgation.